In the execution of signature on a smart card, side channel attacks such as simple power analysis (SPA) have become serious threat 12) . There are the fixed procedure method and the indistinguishable method for SPA resistant methods. The indistinguishable method conceals all branch instructions by using indistinguishable addition formulae but may reveal the hamming weight when an addition chain with the un-fixed hamming weight is used. In the case of hyper-elliptic curve, the indistinguishable method has not been proposed yet. In this paper, we give an indistinguishable addition formulae of hyper-elliptic curve. We also give algorithms which output the fixed-hamming-weight representation for indistinguishable addition formulae and works with or without computation table, which can dissolve the above mentioned problem on the indistinguishable method and are also applied to an elliptic curve scalar multiplication.
Introduction
Elliptic curve cryptosystems and hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems chosen appropriately to avoid known attacks 1),7),15),29),31) are vulnerable only to the Pollard ρ−method 21) and the Pohlig-Hellman method 20) . As a result, they can be constructed over a smaller definition field than discrete-logarithm-problem (DLP)-based cryptosystems 8), 9) and RSA cryptosystems 22) . Elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC) and hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems (HECC) with a 160-bit key are thus believed to have the same security as both the DLP-based cryptosystems and RSA with a 1,024-bit key. This is why ECC and HECC have been attractive in smart card applications, whose memory storage and CPU power is very limited. ECC and HECC execute a scalar multiplication of dP for a secret key d and a publicly known P as a cryptographic primitive, which determines the performance of a smart card.
In executions on a smart card, side channel attacks such as the simple power analysis (SPA) and the differential power analysis (DPA) have become a serious threat. Side channel attacks 12),13) monitor power consumption and even exploit the leakage information related to power consumption to reveal bits of secret key d even though d is hidThis study was partly supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) 17300002 and also partly supported by YAZAKI Corporation. † School of Information Science, Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology † † He joined to this work when he was in JAIST.
den inside the smart card. Thus, developing resistance to SPA, DPA, and specific DPAs, called refined power analysis (RPA) 10) or zeroregister analysis (ZRA) 2) . Many countermeasures 3),4),11),13),14),16),17),19), 30) have been proposed so far.
This paper focuses on countermeasures against SPA, which consists of two main countermeasures: fixed procedure method 6) and indistinguishable method 3) . A fixed procedure method deletes any branch instruction conditioned by a secret d; some examples are the add-and-double-always method 6) , the Montgomery-ladder method 18) , and the SPA-resistant wNAF 19) . The indistinguishable method conceals all branch instructions of scalar multiplication by using indistinguishable addition formulae 26),28), 32) . No indistinguishable addition formulae for a hyperelliptic curve has been proposed yet. An SPA attack against indistinguishable addition formulae that uses the difference in power consumption between multiplication and squaring in the Montgomery multiplication, was proposed 33) , but it can be easily avoided by modifying the Montgomery multiplication or reconstructing indistinguishable addition formulae on the condition that multiplication and squaring are assumed to be different. However, there is another problem with the indistinguishable addition formula in that the hamming weight of d is revealed when it is used to execute dP in an addition chain that depends on the hamming weight. As a result, to make the execution of dP secure, the indistinguishable addition formula needs such an addition chain 6), 18) that outputs a fixed hamming weight for any d. Thus, in order to have an advantage against the fixed procedure method, the indistinguishable method needs an addition chain that outputs a fixed-hamming weight but does not run in a fixed procedure. In the case of binary representation, the add-and-double-always method 6) is only a method that works with the fixed hamming weight for any d. Therefore, it is useless for indistinguishable addition formulae to be used in such addition chains. On the other hand, in the case of signed-binary representation, no method has been proposed that works in a fixed-hamming weight and a fixed procedure. Furthermore, the SPA-resistant window method works in the fixed hamming weight but requires additional points for a precomputed table compared with the ordinary window method 5) . Therefore, these methods are open to further investigation for indistinguishable addition formulae.
In this paper, we first give an indistinguishable addition formula for a hyperelliptic curve. The formula deals with multiplication and squaring differently and thus is secure against the above attack 33) . Then, we present both signed-binary and signed-window algorithms, which work in a fixed hamming weight without additional memory. Our signed binary algorithm always computes dP in ( n 2 − 1) additions and (n − 1) doublings without any precomputed point, where n is the length of NAF representation of d. Compared with the addand-double-always method, our method can reduce the computation amount by 0.2% or 21.3% with the same memory in the case of elliptic curve or hyperelliptic curve, respectively. Our signed w-window algorithm always computes dP in ( n w + 2 w−2 − 2) additions and n doublings with 2 w−2 precomputed points, where n is the length of wNAF representation of d. Compared with the SPA-resistant wNAF 19) , our method can reduce the computation amount by 2.8% with the same memory in the case of a hyperelliptic curve. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes some facts of hyperelliptic curves such as coordinate systems and reviews SPA and DPA with some known countermeasures. Section 3 presents an indistinguishable addition formulae for hyperelliptic curves. Section 4.1 describes the relationship between a hamming-weight leak and the maximum computation amount of an addition chain and then presents the signed-binary algorithm and the signed-window algorithm of 2 w−2 precomputed points in a fixed hamming weight.
Preliminary
This section summarizes some facts about hyperelliptic curves such as coordinate systems, and also reviews SPA, DPA, and RPA together with some known countermeasures.
Hyperelliptic Curve
Let F p be a finite field, where p > 3 is a prime. A hyperelliptic curve C/F p with genus 2 is described as
where
. In the case of p = 5, we can set f 4 = 0. The divisors of a hyperelliptic curve are defined as the free abelian group of points
The degree of D is defined as 
where g is a genus of C. Any divisor in J C is uniquely represented by a reduced divisor. To compute an addition of divisors, Mumford-representation is useful. In Mumfordrepresentation, D ∈ C with the genus 2 is de-
. Hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems (HECC) are defined over J C , whose security depends on a hyperelliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (HECDLP), that is, a problem to find x for a given
Power Analysis
There are two types of power analysis 12),13) : simple power analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA). In the case of elliptic curve and also hyperelliptic curve, DPA is further improved to use a special point with a zero value, the refined power analysis (RPA) 10) and the zero-register analysis (ZRA)
2) . 2.2.1 Simple Power Analysis SPA makes use of such an instruction performed during a scalar multiplication algorithm that depends on the data being processed. Apparently, Algorithm 1 has a branch instruction conditioned by a secret d, and thus it reveals the secret d. To be resistant to SPA, any branch instruction of an exponentiation algorithm should be eliminated. There are two main countermeasures: the fixed procedure method 6) and the indistinguishable method 3) . The fixed procedure method deletes any branch instruction conditioned by a secret exponent d such as the addand-double-always method 6) (Algorithm 2), the Montgomery-ladder method 18) , and the SPAresistant wNAF 19) .
The indistinguishable method conceals all branch instructions of a scalar multiplication algorithm by using indistinguishable addition and doubling formulae. However, use of the indistinguishable addition formula may leak the number of additions if we use an exponentiation algorithm whose number of additions depend on d. Therefore, we need an algorithm that always computes dP in the fixed number of additions and that has a branch instruction to make the indistinguishable addition formula secure and worthy, respectively. Algorithm 1
Algorithm 2
Add-and-double-always algorithm Input: d, P Output: dP 1. T0 = P and T2 = P .
for
3. output T 0 .
Differential Power Analysis
DPA uses correlation between power consumption and specific key-dependent bits. Algorithm 2 reveals d n−2 by computing the correlation between power consumption and any specific bit of the binary representation of 4P .
In order to be resistant against DPA, power consumption should be changed at each new execution of the scalar multiplication.
There are mainly 4 types of countermeasures, the randomized-projectivecoordinate method (RPC) 6) , the randomized curve method (RC) 11) , the exponent splitting (ES)
3), 4) , and the randomized initial point (RIP) 14) , 25) . RPC uses the Jacobian or Projective coordinate to randomize a point P = (x, y) into (r 2 x, r 3 y, r) or (rx, ry, r) for a random number r ∈ F * p , respectively. RC maps an elliptic curve into an isomorphic elliptic curve by using an isomorphism map of (x, y) to (c 2 x, c 3 y) for c ∈ F * p . However, both RC and RPC are vulnerable against RPA and ZRA, which uses a special elliptic-curve point with a zero value of (x, 0) or (0, y) or a register of addition or doubling formula with a zero value. These special points still have a zero value even if it is converted by RPC or RC. The same discussion holds in ZRA. This is why both RC and RPC are vulnerable against RPA and ZRA. The only method secure against RPA and ZRA is ES and RIP, where ES splits an exponent and computes dP = rP + (d − r)P for a randomly integer r and RIP adds a random pint R and computes dP = (dP + R) − R.
Indistinguishable hyperelliptic-curve Addition Formulae
Indistinguishable addition formulae that execute addition and doubling in a unified procedure have been proposed in elliptic curve cryptosystems 26),28),32) . However, because of complicated addition formulae, there has been no indistinguishable addition formula of hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems. Unifying both addition and doubling of hyperelliptic curves is difficult without any dummy execution. This is why we aim to derive indistinguishable addition formulae in hyperelliptic curves.
An addition formula consists of an inversion, multiplication, squaring, addition and subtraction in F p , whose power consumption is decreased in order of inversion multiplication > square addition subtraction.
We revise addition formulae 27) in such a way that both addition and doubling are executed in the same procedure with negligible additional registers and computation. We assume that the computation amount of 2x is equal to that of x + x; that parallelizing is not used; and that registers can be shared between addition and doubling. Our strategies of indistinguishable hyperelliptic-curve addition formulae are as follows.
Dependency analysis. To analyze dependencies between formulae, we use a program dependence graph (PDG) 23) , which is a program data flow graph to make the dependency of each variable clear. Figure 1 Output : t 6 v 3
Fig. 1 Program Dependence Graph
Register allocation and coding. Allocate registers in addition and doubling of formulae 27) by as-late-as-possible (ALAP) scheduling policy 24) . The formulae do not consider the registers' allocation, and many registers are used wastefully. ALAP allocates registers to variables just before they are used. Let sets of operations of each formula be
For two input registers in addition, one register can be used for execution, while the other maintains the input value during execution, and can be used in the next procedure. For doubling, one input register also maintains the input value during execution.
Unifying from the last operation of ADD.
Both the addition and doubling are unified from the last operations of ADD because ADD uses more registers than DBL, and both are similar to each other from the middle to the last operation. As a result, we can reduce the number of registers. Let a set of operations of unified formulae be U = {U 1 , ..., U k }, where U 1 · · · U k are described in execution order and U i consists of addition and doubling operations such as
Unifying from the first operations. Operations of ADD and DBL are unified from the first operation based on the following order, where one additional register for dummy operations are allowed.
• (1) Unifying without dummy operation.
• Choose an executable operation F a.i ∈ ADD. If not, go to (2) .
• Search all executable-operation sequences of DBL with the same operation as
.., choose the longest sequence, and renew U. Retry (1) again.
• (2) Unifying with dummy operations.
• Choose ADD F a.i with the smallest un-unified i. If not, go to (3).
• If there exist operation sequences of executable F d.i in DBL that are the same operation as F a.i , then choose the smallest sequence, insert dummy operations F a.dummy in ADD if necessary, and renew unified formula U . Retry (2) again.
• Otherwise, put dummy operations F d.dummy with the same operation as F a.i in DBL and renew U by using
• Repeat steps (1) and (2) above by changing the order of operations of ADD as long as they can run. Table 1 shows the indistinguishable addition formulae. The efficiency is shown in Table 2 , where M , S, I, Add, and Sub respectively indicate the computation times for multiplication, squaring, inversion, addition, and subtraction. Indistinguishable addition formulae can be derived by adding only a few dummy operations and one register.
Addition Chain with a Fixed Hamming Weight
The computation amount of the addition chain of dP usually depends on "d", which means that an addition chain does not usually work with a fixed hamming weight. In this sec- tion, however, we investigate a condition of an addition chain which does work with a fixed hamming weight. We present Algorithm 3, which always computes dP in the computation of ( i P executes doubling and addition if d i = 1; otherwise it executes only doubling. Therefore, even if we use the indistinguishable addition formula, the number of additions, that is the hamming weight, is leaked by measuring the power consumption. This is why we have to use Algorithm 2 even with the indistinguishable addition formula. The computation amount of indistinguishable addition formulae is larger than that of conventional formulae and, thus, the indistinguishable addition formulae do not give any advantage over the conventional formulae in the case of binary algorithm. Then what algorithm is useful for the indistinguishable addition formula? Let us think about the algorithmic meaning between Algorithms 1 and 2.
As we mentioned above, the complexity of the addition chain depends on d; that is, there are worst and best cases. The worst case in an addition chain means that it works with a fixed hamming weight. Therefore, the indistinguishable addition formula can work in the worst case of an addition chain without revealing the hamming weight (HW). The worst case in Algorithm 1 is, apparently, that the hamming weight (HW) of d is full for n, in which both addition and doubling are done in each bit of d. This is exactly the case of Algorithm 2. Therefore, we can consider Algorithm 2 to be the worst case of Algorithm 1. In the same way, the SPA-resistant wNAF 19) is considered to be the worst case of wNAF.
In summary, the indistinguishable addition formula has an advantage over conventional addition formulae for an addition chain of dP that always works in the worst case of d but has a branch instruction. This is because a conventional addition formula reveals the branch if it is used on such an algorithm. The additionsubtraction chain works in ( w−2 precomputed points. The SPA-resistant wNAF 19) , called S-wNAF in short, needs 2 w−1 precomputed points and always works in ( n w − 1)A + (n − 1)D. We can say that S-wNAF realizes the SPA resistance by the sacrifice of additional precomputed points. Note that the window method has not been proposed that always run with the maximum computation while maintaining 2 w−2 precomputed points.
4.2 Fixed-hamming-weight Signed-binary Algorithm In the NAF representation d n , a non-zero bit is always next to 0. Therefore, the HW of d n is less than or equal to n 2 . We can compute dP while increasing the HW of d n to exactly n 2 by the following rules:
is 00, then execute addition, doubling, subtraction, and subtraction. This means that 00 is converted into 1(1 +1) and then HW is increased by 3.
• Case 2 If d n i is 0, then execute addition and subtraction. This means that 0 is converted into (1 +1) and then HW is increased by 2.
• Case 3 If d n i d n i−1 is 01 or 01, then execute addition, doubling, and subtraction, or subtraction, doubling, and addition, respectively. This means that 01 or 01 is converted into 11 or11, respectively, and then HW is increased by 1. The following algorithm 3 describes these steps in detail. The detailed algorithm to compute dP in the signed binary algorithm with a fixed hamming weight is given as follows, where it starts at the NAF representation d n and computes dP from MSB.
Algorithm 3
Fixed-HW-Signed-binary algorithm Input : Corollary 1 The computation amount of Algorithm 3 is the minimum among the fixed-hamming-weight signed binary algorithms without any additional precomputed point. proof: From Theorem 1, Algorithm 3 can always compute dP in the exact same computation amount as in the worst case of the additionsubtraction algorithm. A worst case of d exists such as d = 10 or 101: they cannot be transformed into an addition-subtraction algorithm that works faster than the worst case. Therefore, the computation amount of Algorithm 3 is the minimum among the fixed-hammingweight algorithms without any additional precomputed point. The detailed algorithm to compute dP using the signed-window method with a fixed hamming weight is given as the following Algorithm 4, where it starts at the wNAF representation d wn and computes dP from MSB with the precomputation table {P, .., 2 w−1 P }.
Algorithm 4
Fixed-wHW signed window algorithm Input : Table 3 compares our methods with previous SPA-countermeasures that do not use any indistinguishable addition formula such as the add-and-double-always algorithm (ADA) 6) or the SPA-resistant wNAF (S-wNAF) 19) . Our methods use indistinguishable addition formulae, which work in 12M + 5S or 23M + 5S + I by using an elliptic-curve-addition formula 28) or our hyperelliptic-curve-addition formula in Section 3, respectively. The previous SPA countermeasures use the best coordinate of the Jacobian or Affine coordinate system 27) that works in 12M + 4S or 22M + 5S + I of addition and 4M +6S or 22M +5S +I of doubling in the case of elliptic or hyperelliptic curves, respectively. We assume that S = 0.8M and I = 10M and the precomputation table is constructed by a simple method of repeating additions to 2P . Now let us compare Algorithm 3 with ADA. Algorithm 3 reduces the computation amount by 0.2% with an elliptic curve or 21.3% with a hyperelliptic curve. Let us compare Algorithm 4 (w = 4) with S-wNAF (w = 3). Algorithm 4 increases or reduces the computation amount by 43.0% or 2.8% with the same memory in the case of elliptic curves or hyperelliptic curves, respectively.
Comparison
We see that our novel combination of an indistinguishable addition formula and the fixed-hamming-weight representation gives a great advantage against the previous approaches of fixed procedure methods of ADA and S-wNAF in the case of hyperelliptic curve.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have given the hyperellipticcurve indistinguishable addition formula for the first time. We have also proposed a new countermeasure against SPA that represents any exponent d with the minimum fixed-hammingweight HW or wHW. The novel combination of our indistinguishable addition formula and our fixed-hamming-weight representation gives an advantage over the previous approaches of fixed procedure methods such as the add-and-doublealways method or the SPA-resistant wNAF in the case of hyperelliptic curve. 
